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In this paper we present an information flow security property for stochastic, cooperating, processes
expressed as terms of the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA). We introduce the notion
of Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) based on the idea that every state reachable by a pro-
cess satisfies a basic Stochastic Non-Interference (SNI) property. The structural operational semantics
of PEPA allows us to give two characterizations of PSNI: the first involves a single bisimulation-like
equivalence check, while the second is formulated in terms of unwinding conditions. The observa-
tion equivalence at the base of our definition relies on the notion of lumpability and ensures that, for
a secure process P, the steady state probability of observing the system being in a specific state P′ is
independent from its possible high level interactions.
1 Introduction
Non-Interference is an information flow security property which aims at protecting sensitive data
from undesired accesses. In particular, it consists in protecting the confidentiality of information by
guaranteeing that high level, sensitive, information never flows to low level, unauthorized, users. It
is well known that access control policies or cryptographic protocols are, in general, not sufficient to
forbid unwanted flows which may arise from the so called covert channels or from some weakness in the
cryptographic algorithms.
The notion of Non-Interference for deterministic systems has been introduced in [17] and it has been
extended to non-deterministic systems. Non-Interference has been then studied in different settings such
as programming languages [16, 30, 31], trace models [22, 25], cryptographic protocols [1, 6, 13], process
calculi [7, 8, 12, 19, 29], probabilistic models [2, 10], timed models [14, 18], and stochastic models [2].
In this paper we study a notion of Non-Interference for stochastic, cooperating, processes expressed
as terms of the Performance Evaluation Process Algebra (PEPA) [20]. We introduce the notion of Persis-
tent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) based on the idea that every state reachable by a process satisfies
a basic Stochastic Non-Interference (SNI) property. By imposing that security persists during process ex-
ecution, the system is guaranteed to be dynamically secure in the sense that every potential transition
leads the process to a secure state. Property SNI is inspired by the Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility
on Compositions (BNDC) property defined in [11] for non-deterministic CCS processes. In our setting,
the definition has the following form: a process P is secure if a low level observer cannot distinguish
the behavior of P in isolation from the behavior of P cooperating with any possible high level process
H. The notion of observation that we consider is based on the concept of lumpability for the underlying
Markov chain [21, 23, 24]. Formally, property SNI is defined as: for any high level process H which
may enable only high level activities,
P\H ≈l (P
H
H)/H
where P\H represents the low level view of P in isolation, while (P
H
H)/H denotes the low level
view of P interacting with the high process H. The observation equivalence ≈l is the lumpable bisim-
ilarity defined in [21] which is a characterization of a lumpable relation over the terms of the process
2algebra PEPA preserving contextuality and inducing a lumping in the underlying Markov processes. No-
tice that this basic security property, that we call Stochastic Non-Interference (SNI) is not persistent in
the sense that it is not preserved during system execution. Thus, it might happen that a system satisfying
SNI reaches a state which is not secure. To overcome this problem we introduce the notion of Persistent
Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) which requires that every state reachable by the system is secure,
i.e., P is secure if and only if
∀P′ reachable from P, P′ satisfies SNI .
Notice that this property contains two universal quantifications: one over all the reachable states and
another one, inside the definition of SNI, over all the possible high level processes which may interact
with the considered system. The main contributions of this paper are:
• we provide a characterization of PSNI in terms of a single bisimulation-based check thus avoiding
the universal quantification over all the high level contexts;
• based on the structural operational semantics of PEPA, we provide a characterization of PSNI
expressed in terms of unwinding conditions;
• we prove that PSNI is compositional with respect to low prefix, cooperation over low actions and
hiding;
• we prove that if P is secure then the equivalence class [P] with respect to lumpable bisimilarity ≈l
is closed under PSNI;
• we show through an example that if P is secure then, from the low level point of view, the steady
state probability of observing the system being in a specific state P′ is independent from the possi-
ble high level interactions of P.
Structure of the paper. The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the process
algebra PEPA, its structural operational semantics, and the observation equivalence named lumpable
bisimilarity. The notion of Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) and its characterizations are
presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we prove some compositionality result and other properties of PSNI.
Comparisons with other SOS-based persistent security properties are discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Calculus
PEPA (Performance Evaluation Process Algebra) [20] is an algebraic calculus enhanced with stochas-
tic timing information which may be used to calculate performance measures as well as prove functional
system properties.
The basic elements of PEPA are components and activities. Each activity is represented by a pair
(α,r) where α is a label, or action type, and r is its activity rate, that is the parameter of a negative
exponential distribution determining its duration. We assume that there is a countable set,A , of possible
action types, including a distinguished type, τ , which can be regarded as the unknown type. Activity rates
may be any positive real number, or the distinguished symbol > which should be read as unspecified.
The syntax for PEPA terms is defined by the grammar:
P ::= P
L
P | P/L | S
S ::= (α,r).S | S+S | A
where S denotes a sequential component, while P denotes a model component which executes in parallel.
We assume that there is a countable set of constants, A. We write C for the set of all possible components.
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(α,r).P
(α,r)−−−→ P
P
(α,r)−−−→ P′
P+Q
(α,r)−−−→ P′
Q
(α,r)−−−→ Q′
P+Q
(α,r)−−−→ Q′
P
(α,r)−−−→ P′
P/L
(α,r)−−−→ P′/L
(α 6∈ L) P
(α,r)−−−→ P′
P/L
(τ,r)−−→ P′/L
(α ∈ L)
P
(α,r)−−−→ P′
A
(α,r)−−−→ P′
(A def= P)
P
(α,r)−−−→ P′
P
L
Q
(α,r)−−−→ P′ 
L
Q
(α 6∈ L) Q
(α,r)−−−→ Q′
P
L
Q
(α,r)−−−→ P
L
Q′
(α 6∈ L)
P
(α,r1)−−−→ P′ Q (α,r2)−−−→ Q′
P
L
Q
(α,R)−−−→ P′ 
L
Q′
R =
r1
rα(P)
r2
rα(Q)
min(rα(P),rα(Q)) (α ∈ L)
Table 1: Operational semantics for PEPA components
2.1 Structural Operational Semantics
PEPA is given a structural operational semantics, as shown in Table 1. The component (α,r).P
carries out the activity (α,r) of type α at rate r and subsequently behaves as P. When a = (α,r), the
component (α,r).P may be written as a.P. The component P+Q represents a system which may behave
either as P or as Q. P+Q enables all the current activities of both P and Q. The first activity to complete
distinguishes one of the components, P or Q. The other component of the choice is discarded. The
component P/L behaves as P except that any activity of type within the set L are hidden, i.e., they are
relabeled with the unobservable type τ . The meaning of a constant A is given by a defining equation
such as A def= P which gives the constant A the behavior of the component P. The cooperation combinator

L
is in fact an indexed family of combinators, one for each possible set of action types, L⊆A \{τ}.
The cooperation set L defines the action types on which the components must synchronize or cooperate
(the unknown action type, τ , may not appear in any cooperation set). It is assumed that each component
proceeds independently with any activities whose types do not occur in the cooperation set L (individual
activities). However, activities with action types in the set L require the simultaneous involvement of
both components (shared activities). These shared activities will only be enabled in P
L
Q when they
are enabled in both P and Q. The shared activity will have the same action type as the two contributing
activities and a rate reflecting the rate of the slower participant [20]. If an activity has an unspecified
rate in a component, the component is passive with respect to that action type. In this case the rate of
the shared activity will be completely determined by the other component. For a given P and action type
α , this is the apparent rate [21] of α in P, denoted rα(P), that is the sum of the rates of the α activities
enabled in P.
The semantics of each term in PEPA is given via a labeled multi-transition system where the multi-
plicities of arcs are significant. In the transition system, a state or derivative corresponds to each syntactic
term of the language and an arc represents the activity which causes one derivative to evolve into another.
The set of reachable states of a model P is termed the derivative set of P, denoted by ds(P), and con-
stitutes the set of nodes of the derivation graph of P (D(P)) obtained by applying the semantic rules
4exhaustively. We denote by A (P) the set of all the current action types of P, i.e., the set of action
types which the component P may next engage in. We denote by Act(P) the multiset of all the current
activities of P. Finally we denote by ~A (P) the union of all A (P′) with P′ ∈ ds(P), i.e., the set of all
action types syntactically occurring in P. For any component P, the exit rate from P will be the sum
of the activity rates of all the activities enabled in P, i.e., q(P) = ∑a∈Act(P) ra, with ra being the rate of
activity a. If P enables more than one activity, |Act(P)|> 1, then the dynamic behavior of the model is
determined by a race condition. This has the effect of replacing the nondeterministic branching of the
pure process algebra with probabilistic branching. The probability that a particular activity completes is
given by the ratio of the activity rate to the exit rate from P.
2.2 Underlying Stochastic Process
In [20] it is proved that for any finite PEPA model P def= P0 with ds(P) = {P0, . . . ,Pn}, if we define the
stochastic process X(t), such that X(t) = Pi indicates that the system behaves as component Pi at time t,
then X(t) is a continuous time Markov chain.
The transition rate between two components Pi and Pj, denoted q(Pi,Pj), is the rate at which the
system changes from behaving as component Pi to behaving as Pj. It is the sum of the activity rates
labeling arcs which connect the node corresponding to Pi to the node corresponding to Pj in D(P), i.e.,
q(Pi,Pj) = ∑a∈Act(Pi|Pj) ra
where Pi 6= Pj and Act(Pi|Pj) = {|a ∈Act(Pi)| Pi a−→ Pj |}. Clearly if Pj is not a one-step derivative of Pi,
q(Pi,Pj) = 0. The q(Pi,Pj) (also denoted qi j), are the off-diagonal elements of the infinitesimal generator
matrix of the Markov process, Q. Diagonal elements are formed as the negative sum of the non-diagonal
elements of each row. We use the following notation: q(Pi) = ∑ j 6=i q(Pi,Pj) and qii = −q(Pi). For any
finite and irreducible PEPA model P, the steady-state distribution Π(·) exists and it may be found by
solving the normalization equation and the global balance equations: ∑Pi∈ds(P)Π(Pi) = 1 and ΠQ = 0.
The conditional transition rate from Pi to Pj via an action type α is denoted q(Pi,Pj,α). This is the sum
of the activity rates labeling arcs connecting the corresponding nodes in the derivation graph which are
also labeled by the action type α . It is the rate at which a system behaving as component Pi evolves to
behaving as component Pj as the result of completing a type α activity. The total conditional transition
rate from P to S⊆ ds(P), denoted q[P,S,α], is defined as
q[P,S,α] = ∑
P′∈S
q(P,P′,α)
where q(P,P′,α) = ∑
P
(α,rα )−−−→P′ rα .
2.3 Observation Equivalence
In a process algebra, actions, rather than states, play the role of capturing the observable behavior
of a system model. This leads to a formally defined notion of equivalence in which components are
regarded as equal if, under observation, they appear to perform exactly the same actions. In this section
we recall a bisimulation-like relation, named lumpable bisimilarity, for PEPA models [21].
Two PEPA components are lumpably bisimilar if there is an equivalence relation between them such
that, for any action type α different from τ , the total conditional transition rates from those components
to any equivalence class, via activities of this type, are the same.
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Definition 1. (Lumpable bisimulation) An equivalence relation over PEPA components,R ⊆ C ×C , is
a lumpable bisimulation if whenever (P,Q) ∈R then for all α ∈A and for all S ∈ C /R such that
• either α 6= τ ,
• or α = τ and P,Q 6∈ S,
it holds
q[P,S,α] = q[Q,S,α] .
It is clear that the identity relation is a lumpable bisimulation. We are interested in the relation which
is the largest lumpable bisimulation, formed by the union of all lumpable bisimulations.
Definition 2. (Lumpable bisimilarity) Two PEPA components P and Q are lumpably bisimilar, written
P≈l Q, if (P,Q) ∈R for some lumpable bisimulationR, i.e.,
≈l =
⋃
{R |R is a lumpable bisimulation}.
≈l is called lumpable bisimilarity and it is the largest symmetric lumpable bisimulation over PEPA
components.
In [21] we proved that lumpable bisimilarity is a congruence for the so-called evaluation contexts,
i.e., if P1 ≈l P2 then
• a.P1 ≈l a.P2;
• P1 L Q≈l P2 L Q for all L⊆A .
• P1/L≈l P2/L.
Notice that the notion of strong equivalence defined in [20] is stricter than that of lumpable bisimi-
larity because the latter allows arbitrary activities with type τ among components belonging to the same
equivalence class.
In [3] a notion of weak bisimulation for CTMCs is introduced. This is based on the idea that the
time-abstract behavior of equivalent states is weakly bisimilar and that the relative speed of these states
to move to a different equivalence class is equal. To capture this intuition, the authors propose a definition
of weak-bisimulation which resembles our notion of lumpable bisimulation if we ignore action types and
labels. This bisimulation is defined in the context of both discrete and continuous time Markov chains
without any notion of compositionality, and hence of contextuality. Compositionality is considered in
[2, 5, 9], where definitions of weak bisimilarities for stochastic process algebra based on the classical
concept of weak action are proposed. Our approach shares with these bisimilarities the idea of ignoring
the rates for non-synchronizing (labeled τ) transitions between a state and the others belonging to the
same equivalence class. The main difference between our definition and those presented in [2, 5, 9] is
that we explicitly studied the relationships between our lumpable bisimilarity at the process algebra level
and the induced lumping of the underlying Markov chains. This led to a coinductive characterization of
a notion of contextual lumpability as described in [21].
3 Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference
The security property named Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference (PSNI) tries to capture every
possible information flow from a classified (high) level of confidentiality to an untrusted (low) one. A
strong requirement of this definition is that no information flow should be possible even in the presence
6of malicious processes that run at the classified level. The main motivation is to protect a system also
from internal attacks, which could be performed by the so-called Trojan Horse programs, i.e., programs
that appear honest but hide some malicious code inside them.
More precisely, the notion of PSNI consists of checking all the states reachable by the system against
all high level potential interactions.
In order to formally define our security property, we partition the setA \{τ} of visible action types,
into two sets,H andL of high and low level action types. A high level PEPA component H is a PEPA
term such that for all H ′ ∈ ds(H),A (H ′)⊆H , i.e., every derivative of H may next engage in only high
level actions. We denote by CH the set of all high level PEPA components.
A system P satisfies PSNI if for every state P′ reachable from P and for every high level process H
a low level user cannot distinguish P′ from P′ 
H
H. In other words, a system P satisfies PSNI if what a
low level user sees of the system is not modified when it cooperates with any high level process H.
In order to formally define the PSNI property, we denote by P\H the PEPA component (P
H
H¯)
where H¯ is any high level process that does not cooperate with P, i.e., for all P′ ∈ ds(P),A (P′)∩A (H¯)=
/0. Intuitively P\H denotes the component P prevented from performing high level actions. Notice that
the definition is well formed in the sense that if H¯1 and H¯2 are two high level processes that do not
cooperate with P, then the derivation graphs of (P
H
H¯1) and (P
H
H¯2) are isomorphic.
Properties SNI and PSNI are formally defined as follows.
Definition 3. (Stochastic Non-Interference) Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ SNI iff ∀H ∈ CH ,
P\H ≈l (P
H
H)/H .
Definition 4. (Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference) Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P′ ∈ ds(P), ∀H ∈ CH ,
P′ ∈ SNI, i.e., P′ \H ≈l (P′ 
H
H)/H .
We introduce a novel bisimulation-based equivalence relation over PEPA components, named ≈hcl ,
that allows us to give a first characterization of PSNI with no quantification over all the high level com-
ponents H. In particular, we show that P ∈ PSNI if and only if P \H and P are not distinguishable
with respect to ≈hcl . Intuitively, two processes are ≈hcl -equivalent if they can simulate each other in any
possible high context, i.e., in every context C[ ] of the form ( 
H
H)/H where H ∈ CH . Observe that
for any high context C[ ] and PEPA model P, all the states reachable from C[P] have the form C′[P′] with
C′[ ] being a high context too and P′ ∈ ds(P).
We now introduce the concept of lumpable bisimulation on high contexts: the idea is that, given two
PEPA models P and Q, when a high level context C[ ] filled with P executes a certain activity moving P
to P′ then the same context filled with Q is able to simulate this step moving Q to Q′ so that P′ and Q′
are again lumpable bisimilar on high contexts, and vice-versa. This must be true for every possible high
context C[ ]. It is important to note that the quantification over all possible high contexts is re-iterated
for P′ and Q′. For a PEPA model P, α ∈A , S⊆ ds(P) and a high context C[ ] we define:
qC(P,P′,α) = ∑
C[P]
(α,rα )−−−→C′[P′]
rα
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and
qC[P,S,α] = ∑
P′∈S
qC(P,P′,α) .
The notion of lumpable bisimulation on high contexts is defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Lumpable bisimilarity on high contexts) An equivalence relation over PEPA components,
R ⊆C ×C , is a lumpable bisimulation on high contexts if whenever (P,Q)∈R then for all high context
C[ ], for all α ∈A and for all S ∈ C /R such that
• either α 6= τ ,
• or α = τ and P,Q 6∈ S,
it holds
qC[P,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α] .
Two PEPA components P and Q are lumpably bisimilar on high contexts, written P≈hcl Q, if (P,Q) ∈R
for some lumpable bisimulation on high contextsR, i.e.,
≈hcl =
⋃
{R |R is a lumpable bisimulation on high contexts}.
≈hcl is called lumpable bisimilarity on high contexts and it is the largest symmetric lumpable bisimulation
on high contexts over PEPA components. It is easy to prove that ≈hcl is an equivalence relation.
The next theorem gives a characterization of PSNI in terms of ≈hcl .
Theorem 1. Let P be a PEPA component. Then
P ∈ PSNI iff P\H ≈hcl P .
Proof. We first show that P\H ≈hcl P implies P ∈ PSNI. In order to do it we prove that
R = {(P1 \H ,(P2 
H
H)/H ) |H ∈ CH and P1 \H ≈hcl P2}
is a lumpable bisimulation. This is sufficient to say that P ∈ PSNI.
First observe that, if P \H ≈hcl P then for all P′ ∈ ds(P) there exists P′′ \H ∈ ds(P \H ) such
that P′′ \H ≈hcl P′ and, by definition of R, for all H ∈ CH , (P′′ \H ,(P′ H H)/H ) ∈ R. Since R
is a lumpable bisimulation, we have that for all H ∈ CH , P′′ \H ≈l (P′ 
H
H)/H . In particular, there
exists H¯ ∈ CH such that (P′ 
H
H¯)/H coincides with P′ \H . Since ≈l is an equivalence relation, by
symmetry and transitivity, we have that for every P′ ∈ ds(P) and for every H ∈CH , P′′ \H ≈l P′ \H ≈l
(P′ 
H
H)/H , i.e., P ∈ PSNI. The fact thatR is a lumpable bisimulation follows from:
• if P1 \H ≈hcl P2 then for all α ∈A with α 6= τ and for all S ∈C /≈hcl and for all high context C[ ],
we have qC[P1\H ,S,α] = qC[P2,S,α]. Since a high context can only perform high level activities,
we have that for all high level context C[ ], it holds that q[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P1 \H ,S,α] and then
q[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P2,S,α], i.e., we have that for all (P1 \H ,(P2 
H
H)/H ) ∈R and for all
S′ ∈ C /R it holds q[P1 \H ,S′,α] = q[(P2 
H
H)/H ,S′,α].
• if P1 \H ≈hcl P2 then for α = τ and for all S ∈ C /≈hcl with P1 \H ,P2 6∈ S and for all high context
C[ ], we have qC[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P2,S,α]. Since a high context can only perform high level ac-
tivities, we have that for all high level context C[ ], it holds that q[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P1 \H ,S,α].
Hence for all (P1\H ,(P2 
H
H)/H )∈R and for all S′ ∈C /R with P1\H ,(P2 
H
H)/H ) 6∈ S′
it holds q[P1 \H ,S′,α] = q[(P2 
H
H)/H ,S′,α].
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R = {(P1 \H ,P2) |P1 \H ≈l P2 \H and P2 ∈ PSNI}
is a lumpable bisimulation on high contexts. Indeed, let C[ ] be a high context and α ∈A .
• Assume α 6= τ . From P1 \H ≈l P2 \H , we have that for all S ∈ C / ≈l , q[P1 \H ,S,α] =
q[P2\H ,S,α]. Since a high context can only perform high level activities, we have that for all high
context C[ ] it holds q[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P1 \H ,S,α]. Moreover, since α 6= τ , q[P2 \H ,S,α] =
qC[P2,S′,α] where S′ = {P |P \H ∈ S}, i.e., for all high context C[ ] and S ∈ C /R it holds
qC[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P2,S,α].
• Consider now α = τ . From P1 \H ≈l P2 \H , we have that for all S ∈ C / ≈l such that P1 \H ,
P2 \H 6∈ S, q[P1 \H ,S,α] = q[P2 \H ,S,α]. Since a high context can only perform high level
activities and both P1\H and P2\H do not perform high activities, we have that q[Pi\H ,S,α] =
qC[Pi \H ,S,α] for all high level context C[ ] and for i ∈ {1,2}. From the fact that P2 ∈ PSNI,
we have P2 \H ≈l (P2 
H
H)/H for all H ∈ CH , and then q[P2 \H ,S,α] = qC[P2 \H ,S,α] =
qC[P2,S′,α] for all high context C[ ], S ∈ C /≈hcl and S′ ∈ C /R such that P2 \H 6∈ S and P2 6∈ S′,
i.e., qC[P1 \H ,S,α] = qC[P2,S,α] for all high context C[ ] and S ∈C /R such that P1 \H ,P2 6∈ S.
Finally, we show how it is possible to give a characterization of PSNI avoiding both the universal
quantification over all the possible high level components and the universal quantification over all the
possible reachable states.
Before we have shown how the idea of “being secure in every state” can be directly moved inside
the lumpable bisimulation on high contexts notion (≈hcl ). However this bisimulation notion implicitly
contains a quantification over all possible high contexts. We now prove that ≈hcl can be expressed in a
rather simpler way by exploiting local information only. This can be done by defining a novel equivalence
relation which focuses only on observable actions that do not belong toH . More in detail, we define an
observation equivalence where actions fromH may be ignored.
We first introduce the notion of lumpable bisimilarity up toH .
Definition 6. (Lumpable bisimilarity up to H ) An equivalence relation over PEPA components, R ⊆
C ×C , is a lumpable bisimulation up to H if whenever (P,Q) ∈ R then for all α ∈ A and for all
S ∈ C /R
• if α 6∈H ∪{τ} then
q[P,S,α] = q[Q,S,α] ,
• if α ∈H ∪{τ} and P,Q 6∈ S, then
q[P,S,α] = q[Q,S,α] .
Two PEPA components P and Q are lumpably bisimilar up to H , written P ≈Hl Q, if (P,Q) ∈ R for
some lumpable bisimulation up toH , i.e.,
≈Hl =
⋃
{R |R is a lumpable bisimulation up toH }.
≈Hl is called lumpable bisimilarity up toH and it is the largest symmetric lumpable bisimulation up to
H over PEPA components.
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The next theorem shows that the binary relations ≈hcl and ≈Hl are equivalent.
Theorem 2. Let P and Q be two PEPA components. Then
P≈hcl Q if and only if P≈Hl Q .
Proof. We first show that P≈hcl Q implies P≈Hl Q. In order to do it we prove that
R = {(P,Q) |P≈hcl Q}
is a lumpable bisimulation up to H . This follows from the following cases. First observe that, by
definition ofR, S ∈ C /≈hcl if and only if S ∈ C /R.
• Let α 6∈H ∪{τ}. From the fact that P ≈hcl Q it holds that for all S ∈ C /≈hcl and for all high
context C[ ], qC[P,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α]. Since α 6∈H ∪{τ}, we have that q[P,S,α] = q[Q,S,α].
• Let α ∈H ∪{τ}. From the fact that P≈hcl Q it holds that for all S ∈C /≈hcl such that P,Q 6∈ S and
for all high context C[ ], qC[P,S,τ] = qC[Q,S,τ]. If C[ ] does not synchronize with P, we have that
q[P,S,τ] = q[Q,S,τ]. On the other hand, consider a context C[ ] with only one current action type
h∈H . Then, from qC[P,S,τ] = qC[Q,S,τ] and q[P,S,τ] = q[Q,S,τ], it follows that if P cooperates
over h then also Q cooperates over h and q[P,S,h] = q[Q,S,h].
We now show that if P≈Hl Q then P≈hcl Q. To this end it is sufficient to prove that
R = {(P,Q) |P≈Hl Q}
is a lumpable bisimulation on high contexts. This follows from the following cases. First observe that,
by definition ofR, S ∈ C /≈hcl if and only if S ∈ C /R.
• Let α 6∈ H ∪ {τ}. From the fact that P ≈Hl Q it holds that for all S ∈ C /≈Hl , q[P,S,α] =
q[Q,S,α]. Since a high context can only perform high level activities, we have that q[P,S,α] =
qC[P,S,α] and q[Q,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α] for all high context C[ ]. Hence, qC[P,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α].
• Let α = τ . From the fact that P≈Hl Q it holds that for all S∈C /≈Hl such that P,Q 6∈ S, q[P,S,α] =
q[Q,S,α]. Hence for all high level context that do not synchronize with P and Q we have that
q[P,S,α] = qC[P,S,α] and q[Q,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α], i.e., qC[P,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α].
• Let h ∈ H . From the fact that P ≈Hl Q it holds that for all S ∈ C /≈Hl such that P,Q 6∈ S,
q[P,S,h] = q[Q,S,h]. From this and the fact that q[P,S,τ] = q[Q,S,τ] it follows that for all high
level context C[ ] with only one current action type h ∈H , qC[P,S,τ] = qC[Q,S,τ]. By induction
on the number of current action types of a high level context C[ ], we obtain that for α = τ , for all
S ∈ C /R with P,Q 6∈ S it holds qC[P,S,α] = qC[Q,S,α].
Theorem 2 allows us to identify a local property of processes (with no quantification on the states
and on the high contexts) which is a necessary and sufficient condition for PSNI. This is stated by the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. Let P be a PEPA component. Then
P ∈ PSNI iff P\H ≈Hl P .
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Finally we provide a characterization of PSNI in terms of unwinding conditions. In practice, when-
ever a state P′ of a PSNI PEPA model P may execute a high level activity leading it to a state P′′, then P′
and P′′ are indistinguishable for a low level observer.
Theorem 3. Let P be a PEPA component.
P ∈ PSNI iff ∀P′ ∈ ds(P),
P′
(h,r)−−→ P′′ implies P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H
Proof. We first prove that if P ∈ PSNI then for all P′ ∈ ds(P), P′ (h,r)−−→ P′′ implies P′ \H ≈l P′′ \
H . Indeed, by Definition 4, P′ ∈ PSNI and therefore, by Corollary 1, P′ \H ≈Hl P′. By Definition
6 of ≈Hl , for all S ∈ C / ≈Hl such that P′ \H ,P′ 6∈ S, both q[P′ \H ,S,τ] = q[P′,S,τ] and q[P′ \
H ,S,h] = q[P′,S,h]. Since P′ \H does not perform any high level action, q[P′ \H ,S,h] = 0 while,
since P′
(h,r)−−→ P′′, q[P′,S, hˆ] 6= 0. Therefore, from P′ \H ≈Hl P′, either h is not a current action type
of P′ or P′ \H ,P′ ∈ S, i.e., P′ \H ≈Hl P′′. Since also P′′ ∈ PSNI, from P′′ \H ≈Hl P′′ it follows
that P′ \H ≈Hl P′′ \H . Finally, since both P′ \H and P′′ \H do not perform any high level activity,
P′ \H ≈Hl P′′ \H is equivalent to P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H .
We now prove that if for all P′ ∈ ds(P), P′ (h,r)−−→ P′′ implies P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H then P ∈ PSNI.
Indeed observe that for all α 6∈H ∪ τ , and for all S ∈ C /≈Hl , q[P′ \H ,S,α] = q[P′,S,α]. Moreover,
if P′ \H ,P′ 6∈ S then q[P′ \H ,S,τ] = q[P′,S,τ]. This is sufficient to prove that P′ \H ≈Hl P′, i.e., by
Corollary 1, P ∈ PSNI.
4 Properties of Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference
In this section we prove some interesting propertis of PSNI. First we prove that PSNI is composi-
tional with respect to low prefix, cooperation over low actions and hiding.
Proposition 1. Let P and Q be two PEPA components. If P,Q ∈ PSNI, then
• (α,r).P ∈ PSNI for all α ∈L ∪{τ}
• P/L ∈ PSNI for all L⊆A
• P
L
Q ∈ PSNI for all L⊆L
Proof. Assume that P,Q ∈ PSNI.
• If P∈ PSNI then for all P′ ∈ ds(P), P′ (h,r)−−→ P′′ implies P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H . This property is clearly
maintained for the PEPA component (α,r).P when α ∈L ∪{τ}.
• If P ∈ PSNI then for all P′ ∈ ds(P), P′ (h,r)−−→ P′′ implies P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H . Let L ⊆ A and
P′/L ∈ ds(P). Assume that P′/L (h,r)−−→ P′′/L. From the fact that P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H we have that
(P′ 
H
H¯) ≈l (P′′ 
H
H¯) for any high level PEPA component H¯ that does not cooperate with P.
From the fact that lumpable bisimilarity is a congruence for the evaluation contexts, we have that
for all L⊆A , (P′ 
H
H¯)/L≈l (P′′ 
H
H¯)/L. We can assume that ~A (H¯)∩L = /0 and hence, since
also ~A (H¯)∩ ~A (P¯) = /0, (P′/L
H
H¯)/L≈l (P′′/L
H
H¯)/L, i.e., (P′/L)\H ≈l (P′′/L)\H .
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• If P,Q∈PSNI then for all P′ ∈ ds(P), P′ (h,r)−−→P′′ implies P′\H ≈l P′′\H and for all Q′ ∈ ds(Q),
Q′
(h,r)−−→ Q′′ implies Q′ \H ≈l Q′′ \H . Let L ⊆ L and P′ L Q′ ∈ ds(PL Q). Assume that
P′ 
L
Q′
(h,r)−−→P′′ 
L
Q′′. In this case, either P′
(h,r)−−→P′′ or Q′ (h,r)−−→Q′′. Assume that P′ (h,r)−−→P′′ and
then P′ 
L
Q′
(h,r)−−→ P′′ 
L
Q′. From the hypothesis that P∈ PSNI we have that P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H ,
i.e., (P′ 
H
H¯)≈l (P′′ 
H
H¯) for any high level PEPA component H¯ that does not cooperate with
P and Q. From the fact that ≈l is a congruence with respect to the cooperation operator we
have (P′ 
H
H¯)
L
(Q′ 
H
H¯) ≈l (P′′ 
H
H¯)
L
(Q′ 
H
H¯), moreover sice H ∩L = /0 we obtain
(P′ 
L
Q′)
H
H¯ ≈l (P′′ L Q′)H H¯, i.e., (P′ L Q′) \H ≈l (P′′ L Q′) \H . In the case that
Q′
(h,r)−−→ Q′′ the proof is analogous.
Notice that the fact that PSNI is not preserved by the choice operatior is a consequence of the fact
that lumpable bisimilarity is not a congruence for this operator.
We now prove that if P ∈ PSNI then the equivalence class [P] with respect to lumpable bisimilarity
≈l is closed under PSNI.
Proposition 2. Let P and Q be two PEPA components. If P ∈ PSNI and P≈l Q then also Q ∈ PSNI.
Proof. Let P ∈ PSNI such that P ≈l Q. Let Q′ ∈ ds(Q) such that Q′ (h,r)−−→ Q′′. From the hypothesis
that P ≈l Q, there exist P′,P′′ ∈ ds(P) such that P′ ≈l Q′ and P′′ ≈l Q′′. Hence there exists r′ such that
P′
(h,r′)−−−→ P′′ and P′ \H ≈l P′′ \H . From the fact that≈l is a congruence with respect to the cooperation
operator we have Q′ \H ≈l Q′′ \H and then also Q ∈ PSNI.
5 Comparison with other SOS-based persistent security properties
The security property presented in this paper is persistent in the sense that if a model P is secure then
all the states reachable by P during its execution are also secure. Persistence is not a common feature of
Non-Interference properties. For example, many properties based on trace models, like generalized Non-
Inference and separability [25], and the non local bisimulation based noninterference properties for the
Markovian process calculus defined in [2] are not persistent. Persistence is used in program verification
techniques based on type-systems to provide sufficient conditions to Non-Interference properties, like,
e.g., in [1, 19, 30, 31]. In this setting persistence provides sufficient static conditions which are invariant
with respect to execution and imply the desired dynamic property.
In [15], a persistent property named P BNDC has been proposed for non-deterministic CCS pro-
cesses. The aim of this definition is to capture a robust notion of security for processes which may move
in the middle of a computation. In this context persistence ensures that a secure process always migrates
to a secure state. Notice that if the system satisfies a non-persistent property then it might migrate when
it is executing in an insecure state and then, from the point of view of the new host, the incoming process
is insecure and, consequently, it should not be executed. As our Persistent Stochastic Non-Interference
property PSNI, property P BNDC is provided with two sound and complete characterizations: one in
terms of a behavioural equivalence between processes up to high level contexts and another one in terms
of unwinding conditions. Let us compare the expressivity of P BNDC and PSNI by considering their
SOS-based characterization in terms of unwinding conditions. The formal unwinding characterization
of P BNDC for CCS processes is the following:
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Definition 7. Let P be a CCS process and H denote the set of all high level actions.
P ∈ P BNDC iff ∀P′ reachable from P ,
P′ h−→ P′′ implies P′ τˆ=⇒ P′′′ and P′′ \H ≈ P′′′ \H
where τˆ=⇒ represents a possibly empty sequence of τ transitions and ≈ denotes Milner’s weak bisimu-
lation relation [27].
Both PEPA and CCS are provided with a structural operational semantics that allows us to compare
the definitions of PSNI (for PEPA processes) and P BNDC (for CCS processes) just by considering
the processes label transition systems eventually removing information concerning the activity rates.
Consider for instance the simple process depicted in Figure 1. If we discard the activity rates we can
interpret the graph as the labeled transition system of a CCS process P. According to Definition 7 we
have that P satisfies P BNDC. On the contrary, when we consider the activity rates we have the model
of a PEPA process P which, according to Theorem 3, does not satisfies PSNI. Indeed we cannot find a
lumpable bisimulation such that P\H ≈l P′ \H .
The unwinding definition of PSNI resembles the definition of Strong BNDC (SBNC) which has been
introduced in [4] as a sufficient condition for verifying P BNDC.
Recently, in [2] Non-Interference properties for processes expressed as terms of a Markovian process
calculus are introduced. The calculus presented in the paper allows the authors to model three kinds of
actions: exponentially timed actions, immediate actions and passive actions. As a consequence, the
proposed process algebra encompasses nondeterminism, probability, priority and stochastic time. The
behavioral observation defined by the authors extends the classical bisimulation relation of Milner [27].
The property named Bisimulation-based Strong Stochastic Local Non-Interference (BSSLNI) is defined
in the style of our unwinding conditions but it is based on an observation equivalence named≈EMB which
abstracts from internal τ actions with zero duration. In particular, the relation ≈EMB is based on the idea
that if a given class of processes is not reachable directly after executing a certain action, then one has
to explore the possibility of reaching that class indirectly via a finite-length path pi of internal actions
with zero duration but with a specific probability of execution prob(pi). As observed by the authors, in
general the performance indices of a system satisfying BSSLNI are not independent from the presence or
the absence of high level interactions.
On the contrary, the observation equivalence at the base of our definition relies on the notion of
lumpability and ensures that, for a secure process P, the steady state probability of observing the system
being in a specific state P′ is independent from its possible high level interactions. In order to show
it consider the simple three state system depicted in Figure 2. In this case, following Theorem 3, we
can prove that P1 ∈ PSNI. Indeed, it is easy to prove that P1 \H ≈l P2 \H when ≈l is the lumpable
bisimilarity. In particular, the probability for a low level user to observe, in steady state, the system being
in state P3 is independent from whether or not P1 has performed the high level activity (h,λ ). To prove
P P′
(τ,λ )
(h,λ )
(l,λ )
Figure 1: A simple two state model.
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P1
P2 P3
(h,λ ) (l,λ )
(l,λ )
(l,ρ)
Figure 2: A simple three state model.
this, suppose that P1 synchronizes over h. Then, for a low level observer, the system behaves as P1/H
depicted in Figure 3 (a). We can compute the steady state distribution of P1/H by solving the global
balance equations together with the normalization condition, obtaining:
pi1 ∗2λ = pi3 ∗ρ
pi2 ∗λ = pi1 ∗λ
pi3 ∗ρ = pi1 ∗λ +pi2 ∗λ
pi1+pi2+pi3 = 1
whose solution is
pi1 = ρ2(λ+ρ) pi2 =
ρ
2(λ+ρ) pi3 =
λ
λ+ρ
where pi1,pi2 and pi3 denote the steady state probabilities of states P1/H , P2/H and P3/H , respectively.
Consider now the case in which P1 does not synchronize over h. Then the low level view of the system
is represented by P1 \H depicted in Figure 3 (b). Again we can compute the steady state distribution of
P1 \H by solving the global balance equations together with the normalization condition, obtaining:
pi1 ∗λ = pi3 ∗ρ
pi3 ∗ρ = pi1 ∗λ
pi1+pi3 = 1
whose solution is
pi1 = ρλ+ρ pi3 =
λ
λ+ρ
where pi1 and pi3 are the steady state probabilities of states P1 \H and P3 \H , respectively. This proves
that, from the low level point of view, the steady state probability of P3 is independent from the fact that
P has cooperated with a high level context or not.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a persistent information flow security property for stochastic processes
expressed as terms of the PEPA process algebra. Our property, named Persistent Stochastic Non-
Interference (PSNI) is based on a structural operational semantics and a bisimulation based observa-
tion equivalence for the PEPA terms. We provide two characterizations for PSNI: one in terms of a
bisimulation-like equivalence relation and another one in terms of unwinding conditions.
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P1/H P1 \H
P2/H P3/H P3 \H
(a) P1/H (b) P1 \H
(τ,λ ) (l,λ )
(l,λ )
(l,λ )
(l,ρ)
(l,ρ)
Figure 3: The models of P1/H and P1 \H .
The first characterization allows us to perform the verification of PSNI for finite state processes in
polynomial time with respect to the number of states of the system [28].
The second characterization is based on unwinding conditions. This kind of conditions for possibilis-
tic security properties have been already explored in the literature, like, e.g., in [29, 26, 22]. Such un-
winding conditions have been proposed for traces-based models and represent only sufficient conditions
for their respective security properties. Differently, our unwinding conditions provide both necessary
and sufficient conditions for PSNI.
Finally, in this paper we also deal with compositionality issues. Indeed, the development of large and
complex systems strongly depends on the ability of dividing the task of the system into subtasks that are
solved by system subcomponents. Thus, it is useful to define properties which are compositional in the
sense that if the properties are satisfied by the system subcomponents then the system as a whole will
satisfy the desired property by construction. We show that PSNI is compositional with respect to low
prefix, cooperation over low actions and hiding.
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